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Introduction 
What explains citizen preferences for redistribution across regions within a country? 
Around the world, countries vary greatly in how much central governments tax wealthier regions 
to redistribute to poorer ones in order to reduce inequality across regions. In many federations or 
multi-tiered polities, these issues are salient, electorally contested, and at times polarizing; they 
have sometimes led to demands for or attempts at secession from disaffected regions.  Such 
issues have been politicized in wealthy countries including Belgium, Canada, Italy, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, as well as in poorer or middle-income states including Argentina, Brazil, 
China, India, Mexico, and Russia. Yet the recent growth in research on the causes and 
consequences of different federal arrangements and fiscal federalism have not studied in depth 
the roots of individual preferences over basic issues related to federal institutions and fiscal 
federalism.  This omission is surprising given the high salience of this package of issues in such 
countries.  
In this paper we address this omission by specifying and testing propositions about 
individual preferences over a key aspect of fiscal federalism: inter-regional redistribution. 
Consistent with a variety of extant theoretical models, we hypothesize that regional and 
individual income should explain variation in preferences for inter-regional redistribution.  We 
build on this literature by hypothesizing that individual-level information about regional income 
positions should also affect preferences. We also argue that the role of this information on such 
preferences may be conditionally relevant given the salience of non-economic factors (i.e. 
identity issues) and political ideology.  
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We focus on evidence regarding such preferences in Spain, because it is an important 
illustrative case where much redistribution across regions (Autonomous Communities or ACs)1 
exists, and where regional redistribution and concerns about regional autonomy have become 
more intensively politically contested and salient over the last decade.  We test our hypotheses 
with a novel experiment embedded in a large nationally representative sample of Spain with an 
oversample in Catalonia. Catalonia is a region with a distinct national and linguistic identity, 
where cultural and fiscal autonomy demands are an integral part of the public debate. 
We assess how knowledgeable citizens are about their own region’s relative income 
position and whether informing citizens of their region’s relative income position affects their 
preferences for regional redistribution. We also see how individuals’ evaluating other regions’ 
incomes alters these preferences. Our experimental research design allows us to leverage 
randomization of two commonly cited interventions that are theorized to affect policy 
preferences in other contexts: information that is domain relevant (in this case, the respondent’s 
regional relative income), and priming of relevant “out-group” or “in-group” categories. The 
impact of information on the respondent’s regional relative income can be thought of as 
exogenously manipulating a region’s relative income, as some citizens learn that their region is 
either poorer or richer than previously thought. This allows us to isolate the causal impact of 
actual changes in relative regional income on preferences.  
Overall, we find the following: 1) regional income alone is a minimal factor in 
accounting for regional redistribution preferences; 2) however, learning about one’s regional 
position affects preferences for regional distribution in directions consistent with some 
theoretical models (specifically, low income respondents in wealthier regions become less 
                                                 
1
 We use the terms “regions” and “ACs” interchangeably.  
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favorable of inter-regional redistribution if they learn that their region is richer than they 
thought); 3) the effects of information are moderated by political ideology and out-group 
priming. We do not find similar informational effects in Catalonia, though we find evidence of 
some priming effects. These findings have implications for the growing comparative politics 
literature on fiscal federalism and the dynamics of decentralization (Rodden 2006, Bakke and 
Wibbels 2007, Beramendi 2012).  The results provide firmer micro-foundations about the 
formation of public opinion on such issues and, more specifically, about how such preferences 
are affected by information, ideology, and out-group priming.  
The paper proceeds as follows: section one describes the relevant literature and our 
hypotheses; section two describes the design; section three describes the results in the control 
group; section four describes the experimental results; section five concludes.  
Section 1: Background & Hypotheses 
Relevant literature 
Research in fiscal federalism and decentralization has progressed in explaining cross-
national variation of the amount of fiscal redistribution across regions, the differing amounts of 
decentralized authority across states, and the related outcomes of successful and/or violent 
regional autonomy movements. The fiscal federalism literature in particular focuses on the 
institutional determinants of why federations redistribute among regions more than others. A 
main conclusion of this literature is that economic theories alone cannot account for this cross-
national variation, and that “initially unequal” federations redistribute less than initially equal 
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federations (Beramendi, 2012; Rodden, 2010; Rodden, 2006); countries often do not adopt the 
most efficient forms of decentralization as predicted by classic models (e.g. Oates, 1999).2 
However, in much of this literature, the underlying theoretical models explaining the 
amount of redistribution across regions are partially based on assumptions about citizen 
preferences over these outcomes.  Yet no study tests these assumptions, in contrast to the 
voluminous literature on preferences for inter-personal redistribution. For example, in models 
such as those by Bolton and Roland (1997), the amount of regional autonomy depends on 
preferences of voters of regions of different incomes; in models of secession such as those by 
Alesina et al. (2005), voters have preferences over taxes and over public goods provision. In 
more recent work, Beramendi (2012) assumes that voters’ regional redistribution and fiscal 
decentralization preferences are conditioned by individual and regional-level income.  
An overlapping literature on regional autonomy movements also has a dearth of 
individual-level data testing assumptions of models.  These models more explicitly incorporate 
“identity” preferences or views of the out-group, but as with the fiscal federalism literature, there 
remains little empirical testing of such assumptions. Much of the empirical progress on this 
question follows from models about the economic optimality of autonomy or secession (Alesina 
et al. 2005; Bolton and Roland 1997; Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini 2001). Some studies 
posit a correlation between conservative ideology and hostility towards immigrants, other “out-
groups,” and even redistribution if it is perceived that redistribution goes principally to 
undeserving out-groups (Klor and Shayo 2010; Billiet, Eisinga, and Scheepers 1996; Ceobanu 
and Escandell 2010; Duckitt, Wagner, Plessis, and Birum 2002; Hodson and Costello 2007; 
                                                 
2 Correlates of higher inter-regional redistribution include proportional electoral systems, larger 
electoral districts, less powerful second chambers, cohesive national parties (Rodden 2010; 
Rodden and Wibbels 2010).  
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Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). However, this literature on negative affinity for out-groups does 
not consider such attitudes in a regional redistribution context. 
Much of the empirical testing in these literatures instead has been in the domain of either 
cross-national or regional-level data on fiscal transfers and regional autonomy demands, or on 
qualitative testing of these theories. Extant public opinion work in fiscal federalism mostly 
examines attitudes about “federalism” generally (e.g. Petersen, et al. 2008).  Related studies on 
individual preferences on autonomy movements document strong correlations between regional 
identity and support for regional autonomy, but focus less on regional redistribution. 
A final limitation of the existing scant public opinion research on regional redistribution 
is that it ignores the importance of information in preference formation. Simple information has 
been found to change preferences in other specific policy contexts (see Duflo and Saez (2003) 
and Chetty and Saez (2009) as examples in US micro policy contexts). The fact that citizens may 
not be informed about the relative income of the region they live in enables us to test whether 
information affects views on regional redistribution. Many of the theoretical assumptions 
underpinning basic models of regional redistribution assume citizens have full information about 
their region’s position in the overall income distribution, which remains an untested assumption.  
We address these limitations and the relative absence of individual-level data in these 
literatures by focusing on preferences for regional redistribution and information about regional 
income. Are individuals in richer regions opposed redistribution to poorer regions, as is 
commonly assumed? What is the relationship between individual and regional income for such 
preferences?  
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Relevance of the Spanish context 
Spain is an especially instructive case because the issues of inter-regional redistribution 
and the current push for fiscal autonomy from Catalonia are politically salient issues.  Political 
polarization in Spain exists more over territorial issues than traditional inter-personal 
redistribution issues (Colomer 1998, Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 2012). Public opinion in 
Catalonia over the last 15 years has drifted towards less support for regional transfers and more 
support for fiscal autonomy for this region (Amat 2012; de la Fuente 2011). The current political 
discourse in Catalonia is that the net transfers from Catalonia to other Spanish regions are an 
important cause of the ongoing debt crisis of the Catalan regional government, and that increased 
fiscal autonomy would alleviate economic problems of this region. In July 2012, the Catalan 
regional government approved a bill in favor of reaching of a “Fiscal Pact” with Spain, which 
would have allowed Catalonia to have an independent tax revenue agency; this pact was rejected 
by the Spanish central government.   
Additionally, in Spain much academic and political controversy exists over the amount of 
income that is taxed in some ACs and transferred to others (Beramendi 2012; de la Fuente 2011; 
León 2007, 2009). Some argue that the system over-equalizes regional incomes, leaving 
relatively richer regions in worse off position as compared to relatively poorer regions, post-
transfers (Paluzie 2010, 364-367), and that such regional transfers generate perverse incentives 
for subsidized regions (Montasell and Sánchez 2012).
3
 Others counter that regional transfers 
within Spain have stabilizing effects that benefit the national economy, and that richer regions 
should be obligated to transfer more to poorer ones (de la Fuente 2011).  
                                                 
3
 Beramendi (2012) in Chapter 7 provides an efficient summary of the development of the 
system of inter-region fiscal transfers and decentralized institutional change in Spain. 
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Hypotheses 
We focus on two sets of hypotheses of individual preferences for regional redistribution, 
building on the literatures described above. The first set focuses on the roles of regional and 
individual income. In the discussion of our design, we elaborate on how the provision of 
information tests the impact of information on such preferences, but also how the manipulation 
of information also has the effect of exogenously changing an individual’s relative regional 
income, allowing us to better isolate the impact of regional income on preferences. We also 
examine how other individual characteristics theorized to be correlated with support for 
individual redistribution, such as ideology, moderate the impact of this information. The second 
set of hypotheses focuses on regions as potential out-groups and the role of second-dimensional 
politics.  
Regarding the first set of hypotheses, we build on basic models of inter-regional 
redistribution, which draw on models of individual level preferences for taxes and transfers. A 
naive expectation is that individuals in richer regions should be more opposed to regional 
redistribution:  
H1: Citizens in richer (poor) regions should be less (more) supportive of redistribution 
from richer to poorer regions 
 However, recent models of fiscal federalism emphasize the role of individual as well as 
regional income, in particular the recent innovative examination of the political underpinnings of 
fiscal centralization and regional redistribution by Beramendi (2012). His theoretical framework 
is one of the few to explicitly incorporate individual-level preferences over these outcomes, by 
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distinguishing poor versus rich individuals in poor and rich regions.
4
 We build on the basic 
framework which derives individual preferences for the amount of fiscal decentralization, and 
implicitly, the amount of inter-regional redistribution, from regional income, individual income, 
and the amount of inequality in a region. If we consider the four quadrants of rich versus poor 
individuals in rich versus poor regions, another straightforward expectation regarding inter-
regional redistribution is that the two “extremes” of these quadrants should have more opposing 
views.  This leads to the hypotheses:  
H2a: Richer citizens in richer regions should be less supportive of redistribution from 
richer to poorer regions 
H2b: Poorer citizens in poorer regions should be more supportive of redistribution from 
richer to poorer regions 
What about potentially cross-pressured individuals, the poor citizens in rich regions and 
rich citizens in poor regions? We hypothesize that poor individuals in rich regions should also be 
more opposed to regional redistribution. First, as they are potential beneficiaries of 
redistribution, they should be expected to be against redistributive schemes that target a group of 
beneficiaries that explicitly excludes them. Second, if regional redistribution is understood as a 
transfer to poor regions financed through a flat tax on residents on rich ones, poor individuals in 
rich regions should be most hostile to such transfers. Finally, as Beramendi argues, in richer 
regions that are more equal relative to the union, poor individuals in rich regions should be more 
opposed to centralization structures (and thus regional redistribution) because they will be more 
                                                 
4
 For Beramendi, the main political variables explaining cross-national variation in the degree of 
decentralization are aspects of national-level political institutions and inter-regional differences. 
We focus on individual preferences and set aside country-level factors such as average labor 
mobility or the nature of the representation system.  
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harmed from centralized redistribution, as the net beneficiaries would be those living in poorer 
regions.  
Similarly, we expect that rich individuals in poor regions might be more supportive of 
regional redistribution, as the net transfers can take the form of public goods that uniformly 
benefit the population of the poor region. Further, as predicted by Beramendi, such citizens in 
more unequal regions are more likely to support centralization and regional redistribution, as this 
reduces the political demand for intra-regional redistribution.
5
 Hence: 
H2c: Poorer citizens in richer regions should be less supportive of redistribution from 
richer to poorer regions 
H2d: Richer citizens in poorer regions should be more supportive of redistribution from 
richer to poorer regions 
We now turn to hypotheses that go beyond basic individual and regional income factors. 
One of the main assumptions of all previous models of such preferences is that citizens are 
informed of their region’s relative income. We detail in the design section how the fact that 
respondents are not fully informed about regional relative income permits us to test the impact of 
                                                 
5
 See Chapter 2 in Beramendi (2012) for a full discussion of how regional inequality affects 
preferences. Our general predictions of regional redistribution in hypothesis 2 are not dependent 
on assumptions about regional inequality. But the Spanish case offers some advantages in this 
respect because the regional wealth and inequality patterns are consistent in a way that allows us 
to test hypotheses consistent with Beramendi’s framework. There is a strong correlation between 
intra-regional inequality and regional per capita income; all of the Spanish regions with a per 
capita income above the median (except for Castile and Leon, the eighth wealthiest region) have 
lower levels of inequality than the mean across regions, and all regions below the median but 
(except for one, Murcia) have higher levels of inequality than the regional mean. Data are 
compiled by using Household Survey Data from the Spanish Statistical National Institute (INE).  
See also Aldás et al. (2007) and Beramendi (2012): 188. 
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information about regional income on preferences. Our design, by manipulating information, 
simulates the effect of changing a citizens’ relative regional income, because they learn the true 
position of their region’s position. This allows us to test the causal impact of a change in relative 
regional income.  Broadly, we expect the following:  
H3: Citizens who learn that their region is poorer (richer) will be more (less) supportive 
of regional redistribution compared to those who do not learn 
For reasons of brevity, we do not elaborate on H3 for all expected combinations regarding 
individual and regional income described in H2, but discuss these extensions in the results 
section.   
We also hypothesize that, consistent with the vast literature on inter-personal 
redistribution, political ideology should affect views of regional redistribution. This could be due 
to higher sensitivity of left-wing individuals to issues and information regarding redistribution 
(Jacoby 1991, Goren 2004). 
H4a: Left-wing individuals are more supportive of regional redistribution; left-wing 
individuals will be more supportive of redistribution if they learn their region is poorer 
H4b: Right-wing individuals are less supportive of regional redistribution; right-wing 
individuals will be less supportive of redistribution if they learn their region is richer  
A second set of hypotheses is derived from the literature on identity or out-group 
concerns and support for redistribution, summarized in the previous section. These models 
generally predict that cultural identity salience of the out-group should dampen support for 
redistribution towards that group. 
H5: Citizens who are primed to consider their in-group (the out-group) will be more 
(less) supportive of regional redistribution  
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Note that H5 is not dependent on any particular assumption of whether the citizen views 
the out-group region to be a richer or poorer region. But, we hypothesize that priming of out-
group regions that are wealthier (i.e. Catalonia and the Basque Country in the case of Spain) is 
likely to increase support for regional redistribution for citizens outside those regions because 
people are more willing to receive redistribution from these out-groups; the relative position of 
the out-group region in the regional income distribution is generally common knowledge.  The 
directional predictions in this hypothesis might be distinct in a region that is richer and an “out-
group.” For example, within Catalonia (ranked fourth in income per capita in Spain), increasing 
salience of the out-group for those in Catalonia (the rest of Spain) and the in-group (Catalonia) 
should reduce support for regional redistribution.   
 
Section 2: Design 
 To test the above hypotheses, we gathered data using a web-based survey of 4,000 
respondents in Spain in July 2012. The survey was administered by Netquest, a Spanish survey 
firm. The resulting sample has a similar demographic composition to large nationally 
representative surveys in Spain (i.e. those fielded by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) 
and it included an oversample of Catalonia (n = 1,200).6  
The dependent variable is whether the citizen prefers more or less inter-regional 
redistribution. Respondents outside of Catalonia (n = 2,800) were randomly assigned to a control 
                                                 
6
 Appendix A gives an overview of Netquest’s stratification and sampling strategy. The 
supplemental online appendix (SOA) compares our survey to others on the relevant social and 
demographic variables. It shows no statistically significant differences in the distributions of 
these variables between the surveys. Our sample has a slight oversample of younger respondents; 
all analyses that are re-estimated with weights for age do not change the results. 
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group and a treatment group with equal probabilities. In the control group respondents were first 
asked this policy preference. They were asked afterwards to place the relative income position of 
their own AC and two other randomly selected ACs, receiving no information. Spain has 17 ACs 
and two independent cities; respondents simply had to choose an integer number 1 through 19 
for each AC (with 1 referring to the on average richest AC, and 19 indicating the poorest).
7
  In 
the treatment group, respondents were asked about the relative placement of their own AC and 
two others, but they were then told the correct relative position of their own AC. Individuals then 
answered the same dependent variable questions as the control group.  
This design enables us to determine whether accurate information about the respondent’s 
AC’s relative regional income affects preferences for regional redistribution. It also allows us to 
measure the impact of respondents actually exogenously becoming relatively poorer or richer 
because they are learning that their region is poorer or richer than previously thought. In 
addition, the fact that people were asked about the relative placement of two randomly assigned 
regions (in addition to their own) allows us to determine whether being asked to consider 
specific regions affects these preferences. 
 We employed a similar design for residents in Catalonia but with two additional 
treatments. For Catalonia respondents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental 
groups, with a .2 probability assignment for the first two and .3 probability assignment for the 
latter two. In the control group, respondents answered the same questions as the control group 
                                                 
7
 The information question in Spanish is, “Como usted sabe, en España hay 17 comunidades 
autónomas más las 2 ciudades autónomas de Ceuta y Melilla. Si ordenáramos estas 19 
autonomías según su renta media, colocando a la más rica en la posición 1 y a la más pobre en la 
posición 19, ¿en qué posición diría usted que está [región X]?” Appendix B gives the objective 
ranking of each AC from the INE. 
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for the rest of Spain.  In the second experimental group, the “cultural treatment” group, 
respondents answered three questions that were designed to make the Catalan culture and 
language issue salient8, followed by the same question about regional redistribution. (After 
answering the dependent variable question, respondents in these first two groups were also asked 
to rank Catalonia and two other randomly chosen ACs).  In the third experimental group, the 
“information treatment group,” respondents (as the respondents in the rest of Spain) were asked 
about the relative placement of Catalonia as well as two other randomly chosen ACs, and were 
told the correct placement of Catalonia.  In the fourth and final group, the “both treatments” 
category, respondents were asked about the relative placement of Catalonia as well as two other 
randomly chosen ACs, and were then told the correct placement of Catalonia; they then 
answered the same three questions as in Group 2 designed to make the cultural dimension of 
Catalan relations salient and they then answered the same dependent variable questions. Table 1 
displays the experimental design.
9
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The three questions asked about strength of Catalan identification, views on Catalan language 
instruction in schools, and views on Catalan language autonomy. 
9
 The randomization checks in the SOA demonstrate the successful randomization of the 
treatments; no significant covariates in the Spanish only sample predict treatment assignment. In 
the Catalan sample, those who identify strongly as Catalan are slightly less likely to be assigned 
to the control group; in the discussion of the results for the section, all models control for degree 
of Catalan identification as well as if the respondent speaks Catalan as a native language (which 
is uncorrelated with treatment assignment).   
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Table 1: Experimental Design 
Experimental 
Group 
Geographic 
location 
Information 
Treatment 
Catalan 
Cultural 
Prime 
Treatment 
Probability of 
Receiving 
Treatment 
within 
Geographical 
Area  
Control Group Spain 
excluding 
Catalonia 
No No .5 
Group 2 Spain 
excluding 
Catalonia 
Yes No .5 
Group 3 Catalonia No No .2 
Group 4 Catalonia No Yes .2 
Group 5 Catalonia  Yes No .3 
Group 6 Catalonia Yes Yes .3 
 
 Regarding the dependent variable, the regional redistribution question asked respondents 
how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement that the Spanish fiscal system should 
transfer resources from high-income regions to low-income regions. Response options for the 
redistribution preference question are very much agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, somewhat disagree, and very much disagree, with “1” being “very much agree / 
somewhat agree” and “0” otherwise. 
Unless otherwise noted, all independent variables are coded as binary. Income is a ten-
point scale corresponding to household deciles.  Education is coded on a three-point scale, with 
the categories referring to the highest level of education completed: primary or basic secondary, 
upper secondary, or university. Age is coded on a four-point scale (the increasing scale intervals 
are 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 60-64). Political ideology is the standard 10 point scale, with 1 being 
most left and 10 being most right-wing. Female is coded 1 and unemployed is coded as 1. 
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Section 3: Results from the Control Group 
Descriptive statistics – preferences 
We first discuss descriptive statistics from the control groups to assess baseline 
preferences. For presentational clarity we discuss descriptive statistics and analyses for Spain 
without Catalonia, and then for Catalonia specifically. Appendix C presents the descriptive 
statistics on the demographic variables of interest. 
A majority of respondents (52 per cent) in the populated-weighted sample are favorable 
to redistribution from rich to poor regions. The two clear outliers are the two culturally distinct 
regions of the Basque Country and Catalonia, where support plummets to 24 percent and 23 
percent, respectively. Support for regional redistribution is roughly the same across rich and poor 
individuals living in poor regions (about 60 percent), but individual income seems to matter in 
rich regions: 54 percent of rich individuals in rich regions support regional redistribution, but 
only 48 percent of poor ones.
10
   
What do people know about where their region is in the distribution of income? Figure 1 
presents histograms of the difference in the actual position of a region and the belief of 
respondents (regions with less than 80 respondents are not included in the graph). They are 
centered at zero, represented by the red vertical line, which corresponds to those respondents that 
have assigned the correct ranking to their own region. Those to the right of the red line indicate 
beliefs that the region has a relative ranking higher than the actual one; those to the left of the red 
line believe that the region has a relative ranking lower than the actual one. Partially due to the 
truncated nature of the data, people in rich regions tend to deviate to the left of the right value, 
                                                 
10
 Rich and poor individuals are defined by being in the bottom or top five deciles; rich and poor 
regions are defined by being above or below the median region income. 
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and people in poor regions to the right. For example, for poorer regions, 62 percent of 
individuals believe their region is richer than it actually is; among richer regions, only 23 percent 
of individuals believe their region is richer than it actually is. These patterns indicate that we 
should be cautious in interpreting the treatment of giving information on actual regional ranking 
as an average effect, as different individuals will of course learn whether their region is richer or 
poorer.
11
  The dispersion around the red lines indicates how much inaccuracy citizens in the 
region have about the position of their CA; the greatest variation in perceptions is observed in 
middle-income regions. Overall, the results demonstrate some accuracy among some 
respondents, but also much imperfection and lack of knowledge of relative placement.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 On average, individuals in rich regions are more likely to learn that their region is richer than 
they thought, while individuals in poor regions are more likely to learn that their region is poorer 
than they thought. To partially accommodate this issue and to test hypotheses more directly 
building on previous frameworks (particularly hypotheses 2), we examine the impact of 
information on the four quadrants of individuals: poor people in poor region, poor people in rich 
regions, rich individuals in rich regions, and rich individuals in poor regions. This analysis better 
demonstrates how the effect of information can vary for individuals with differing individual and 
regional incomes. Throughout the discussion of the results, we note that the information effects 
have varying effect sizes for individuals of different incomes, some of whom are more likely to 
learn they are richer or poorer. We can interpret our treatment effects for those who believe their 
region is poorer or richer than it actually is what the impact of such knowledge is, but of course, 
such individuals who have such beliefs may differ from the average population. As Figure 1 
shows, most individuals are mistaken about their region’s true position. 
 Figure 1. Difference in the perceived relative location 
 
Estimations from the control group
We first estimate a series of logistic estimation equations where the dependent variable is 
whether the respondent supports transfers 
much confirmation of Hypothesis 1. But we find partial confirmation of 
and rich individuals will differ depending on if they live in a poor or rich region
displays these estimations for Spain without Catalonia and for Catalonia se
1, the relevant independent variables of interest are regional income position as well as the 
respondent’s perceived relative position
variables, the coefficient on relative region r
redistribution (recall that the scale is 1
regions; this eases interpretation as positive coefficients indicate greater support for regional 
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of the AC and the actual position 
: Explaining preferences for inter-regional transfers
from rich to poor regions. Overall, we do not find 
the intuition that poor 
 of the region. Without considering other demographic 
ank only has a minimal effect on 
-19, with higher values indicating relatively 
 
 
 
. Table 2 
parately. For column 
support for 
poorer 
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redistribution). A one-rank increase in regional income leads to one percentage point increase in 
support for regional redistribution.  But as column 1 shows, controlling for demographic 
variables including individual income, gender, labor market status, and residence in a region 
where linguistic/territorial issues are salient (Basque Country, Navarre, Catalonia) dampens the 
effect of the AC relative income variable. As expected, respondents in those three areas are less 
likely to support inter-regional redistribution (note that these are the three of the four richest 
regions in Spain). Further, in almost all regions, the citizen’s own self-placement of the region’s 
income is uncorrelated with support for regional redistribution.
12
  This is some disconfirmation 
of hypothesis 1. 
Table 2 demonstrates that if we ignore the potential cross-pressuring effects hypothesized 
above, individual income seems to be uncorrelated with support for such inter-regional 
redistribution.
13
  But as column 2 of Table 2 shows, the indicator of whether a person is poor or 
rich and in a self-perceived rich or poor region matters. If we introduce simple binary indicators 
indicating which of the four regional/individual income quadrants an individual is in, where the 
baseline group is that of poor individuals in poor regions, poor individuals in rich regions are 
more hostile towards regional redistribution. The estimated marginal effect of being a poor 
person in a rich region relative to being a poor person in a poor region is eight percentage points. 
These findings provide partial confirmation of hypothesis 2c. However, the data from the control 
group do not confirm the hypotheses that in poor regions, poor and rich individuals differ 
regarding their preferences.  
                                                 
12 These results hold if we use actual regional GDP per capita instead of regional rank; we use 
regional rank as it eases interpretation of the coefficients. 
13
 The interaction term between income and regional income is also statistically insignificant. 
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Within the control group in Catalonia, individual income is uncorrelated with support for 
regional redistribution.  As Column 3 of Table 2 displays, binary identification with being 
Catalan as opposed to Spanish is unsurprisingly negatively correlated with support for regional 
redistribution. Individuals who identify as exclusively Catalan, or more Catalan than Spanish, are 
16 percentage points less likely to support redistribution across regions. Overall, the results are 
consistent with those of Amat (2012), who also finds that in regions where second-dimensional 
politics are active there is less support for regional redistribution.   
  
21 
 
Table 2: Estimation Results in Control Group for Spain and Catalonia 
Sample: Spain exc. Catalonia Catalonia 
DV 
M1: 
Inter-reg. transfers 
M2: 
Inter-reg. transfers 
M3:  
Inter-reg. transfers 
    
Actual region rank 0.0100   
 (0.012)   
    
Own region rank 0.014 0.0139  
 (0.012) (0.0117)  
    
Income Decile 0.020  0.027 
 (0.023)  (0.067) 
    
Female -0.29
**
 -0.286
**
 0.16 
 (0.11) (0.114) (0.37) 
    
Age category 0.015
***
 0.0152
**
 0.029
**
 
 (0.0051) (0.00514) (0.015) 
    
Unemployed 0.015 0.0168 0.41 
 (0.14) (0.142) (0.49) 
    
Education -0.021 -0.0213 -0.065 
 (0.088) (0.0872) (0.27) 
    
Ideology -0.044
*
 -0.0444
*
 -0.099 
 (0.025) (0.0253) (0.084) 
    
Resides in Basque Country -1.22
***
 -1.239
**
  
 (0.25) (0.253)  
    
Strong Catalan Identif.    -0.65
***
 
   (0.15) 
    
Rich ind. in rich region  0.0203  
  (0.170)  
    
Rich ind. in poor region  -0.0482  
  (0.157)  
    
Poor ind. in rich region  -0.308
*
  
  (0.166)  
    
    
Constant -0.16 0.0912 -0.29 
 (0.37) (0.380) (1.23) 
N 1405 1405 221 
pseudo R
2
 0.037 0.038 0.112 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Section 4: Treatment effects  
 We first present the treatment results testing the hypotheses for Spain excluding 
Catalonia. We then turn to the experimental results in Catalonia specifically.  
The impact of information on preferences in Spain (excluding Catalonia) 
We find evidence that informing individuals of the true relative income position of their 
region affects preferences for inter-regional redistribution, partially confirming H3. We posit that 
this information isolates the impact of actual changes in relative regional income on preferences, 
as respondents are learning if their region is in fact relatively richer or poorer. The treatment is 
thus a manipulation in change in relative regional income. To assess its impact, we compare 
individuals across the experimental groups who are all incorrect in a specific direction (they 
either believe their region is poorer or richer than it actually is); we compare the impact of the 
respondent learning about the region’s true relative position to those who were wrong in the 
same direction, but are not revealed their region’s true position. Simple difference of means tests 
between the experimental and control groups demonstrate the impact of this information and thus 
actual change in relative regional income.  
First, individuals who learn that their region is poorer than they thought are more 
supportive of redistribution from wealthier regions to poorer ones (.60 vs. .64, p<.09). This is 
consistent with hypothesis 3. But on average, we do not find evidence that learning that one’s 
region is relatively richer reduces support for regional redistribution.   
Next, we find that among those living in rich regions, learning that the region is richer 
than previously thought reduces support for regional-redistribution. These results are displayed 
in Figure 2. In richer regions, respondents who learn that the region is richer than they 
previously thought are less supportive of regional redistribution (.60 vs. .51, p<.03).  This result 
 is most pronounced in the quadrant of 
For these individuals, learning that the region is richer than previously thought 
support for inter-regional redistribution. This evidence is co
evidence that poorer citizens in richer regions are most hostile towards redistribution across 
regions.  
Figure 2. Treatment effects for those who learn that their region is richer by personal 
regional income 
 
Note: Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals
 
This experimental evidence 
in rich regions would be more hostile towards regional redistribution; as Beramendi argues, 
individuals “are better off pursuing a decentralized system of interpersonal redistribution in 
                                                
14
 If we restrict the sample to respondents outside of the Basque Country and Navarre, this 
difference increases (.61 vs .44, p<.01).
23 
poorer respondents in richer regions
nsistent with the control group 
 
is consistent with some of the intuitions of why poor people 
 
 
 (.53 vs. .41, p<.04).14  
strongly reduces 
and 
 
such 
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which they are the beneficiaries of fiscal transfers occurring only within their region rather than 
engaging in class solidarity with the rest of the union” (Beramendi 2012, 11). But, we do not find 
similar information effects for citizens in poor regions; changing their relative regional income 
via information does not have a significant effect. Nor do we find for these individuals that 
learning that the region is poorer than expected makes respondents more likely to support 
redistribution. We discuss these asymmetrical effects for learning that one is poorer versus richer 
below.  
We also find that political ideology is an important moderator of the impact of 
information on preferences regarding regional redistribution. Left-wing individuals who learn 
their region is poorer become more supportive of regional redistribution, compared to left-wing 
individuals who do not learn this (.64 vs. .72, p<.05).15 Figure 3 displays this effect. No such 
effect exists for right-wing individuals. Perhaps surprisingly, left-wing individuals who learn 
they are richer also become less supportive of regional redistribution. This result of left-wing 
individuals’ preferences on regional redistribution being more sensitive to relevant information 
could be due to several reasons. First, equality concerns are typically more central for left-
leaning people and thus such individuals might be more responsive to information or shifts in 
relative income. The fact that left-wing individuals are capable of being more hostile towards 
regional redistribution indicates that altruism may be a less important component of left-wing 
ideology, at least in the context of regional redistribution.
16
  Second, as we discussed the 
                                                 
15
 Ideology is coded as left-wing being 1-4 on the ideology scale and 5-10 for non-left-wing; the 
results do not change if we recode left-wing to be 1-5.  
16 The political psychology literature on how core ideological beliefs affect preferences over 
policy issues is vast. See Jacoby (1991), Goren (2004), Jost et al. (2009). Note that arguments 
about the impact of information or changes in relative income on left-wing citizens’ preferences 
 literature on second dimensional and identity salience (and as we show below), preferences 
towards regional redistribution are also likely informed by cultural and national considerations; 
information regarding only regional income may not matter for more righ
their concern about regional politics is driven by identity or out
Figure 3. Treatment effects by ideology 
Note: Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals
 
                                                                                
are distinct from predictions that such information will always make such citizens more pro
redistribution.   
17
 Right-wing ideology and nationalist attitudes are correlated in the Spanish context; an
2012 CIS survey found that 64 percent of right
individuals declared themselves to be “very proud” of being Spanish (CIS Survey 2958). We 
also test theories of partisan bias by examining whether treat
preference, by estimating models conditioning on the partisan affiliation and interacting partisan 
affiliation with the information treatment; we find no statistically significant effects of party 
affiliation. See the SOA. 
25 
t-
-group considerations.
 
 
                                        
-wing individuals versus 37 percent of left
ment effects vary by partisan 
wing individuals if 
17
  
 
                                     
-
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These treatment effects on preferences for regional redistribution remain when we 
estimate standard logistic models with relevant demographic covariates as controls. The results 
are displayed in Tables 3 and 4; Table 3 examines the treatment effect for respondents who learn 
that their region is poorer than they thought (relative to similarly incorrect individuals who do 
not learn in the control group).  Table 4 does the same comparison for individuals who learn their 
region is richer than they thought (relative to similarly incorrect individuals in the control group). 
We can interpret the coefficient on the treatment as the causal effect of learning that the region is 
poorer (Table 3) or richer (Table 4). Each of the columns for both tables displays estimations 
conditioning on the main groups of interest as theorized by the literature: poor versus rich 
individuals living in poor versus rich regions, as well as left-wing versus right-wing ideology. 
The estimated marginal effect of information for all respondents learning their region is poorer 
than they thought is about five percentage points.  This effect is greater than moving one 
category up in the age variable. While the effect of the information treatment is modest and 
slightly imprecisely estimated (p<.12), it is notable that the information itself matters much more 
than individual or regional income.     
Column 2 of Table 3 compares poor citizens in rich regions who learn that their region is 
richer with citizens who are similarly incorrect but do not learn; this effect is about negative 13 
percentage points.  Note that the coefficients for the treatment for other categories of individuals 
are in the expected directions, but imprecisely estimated. The treatment has no effect on rich 
individuals generally. Column 6 of Tables 3 and 4 confirm the previously stated difference of 
means effects for left-wing ideology: left-wing individuals who learn their region is poorer 
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become more supportive of regional redistribution, while left-wing individuals who learn their 
region is richer become more hostile towards regional redistribution.18     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 We find no evidence that the size of difference between the respondent’s self-placement and 
actual AC rank on preferences. The interaction term between the absolute difference and 
treatment variable is statistically insignificant. The information results are driven more by 
respondents learning whether they are richer or poorer as opposed to the amount by which they 
learn they are richer or poorer.  
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Table 3. Treatment effects for those who learn region is poorer than they thought  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 All 
Low 
income, 
rich 
region 
Low 
income, 
poor 
region 
High 
income, 
rich 
region 
High 
income, 
poor 
region 
Left Non-left 
        
Actual region rank 0.0235
**
 0.0700 0.0868
**
 -0.0511 0.0631
*
 0.0503
**
 0.00520 
 (0.0114) (0.103) (0.0318) (0.0819) (0.0340) (0.0178) (0.0151) 
        
Income Decile 0.0257 -0.111 0.0561 -0.0649 -0.104 0.0697
*
 -0.0105 
 (0.0240) (0.172) (0.0657) (0.132) (0.0765) (0.0390) (0.0309) 
        
Female -0.253
**
 0.682 -0.0383 -0.391 -0.574
**
 -0.246 -0.277
*
 
 (0.119) (0.513) (0.179) (0.335) (0.210) (0.188) (0.157) 
        
Age category 0.130
**
 0.0716 0.106 -0.0931 0.252
**
 0.168
*
 0.0976 
 (0.0571) (0.239) (0.0838) (0.176) (0.101) (0.0919) (0.0741) 
        
Unemployed -0.0196 -0.195 -0.00979 0.467 -0.0588 0.211 -0.179 
 (0.152) (0.537) (0.191) (0.734) (0.347) (0.245) (0.197) 
        
Education 0.0543 -0.0957 -0.268
**
 0.780
**
 0.324
*
 0.114 -0.00362 
 (0.0913) (0.393) (0.127) (0.330) (0.168) (0.151) (0.116) 
        
Ideology -0.0860
**
 0.0145 -0.0595 -0.0902 -0.130
**
 0.102 -0.0240 
 (0.0263) (0.109) (0.0396) (0.0735) (0.0470) (0.0887) (0.0514) 
        
Treatment 0.183 0.492 0.159 0.288 0.115 0.377
**
 0.0445 
 (0.116) (0.490) (0.175) (0.332) (0.202) (0.187) (0.152) 
        
Constant 0.0275 -0.297 -0.558 -0.127 -0.220 -1.324
**
 0.341 
 (0.354) (1.498) (0.657) (1.290) (0.922) (0.574) (0.527) 
        
pseudo R
2
 0.018 0.043 0.024 0.050 0.053 0.036 0.008 
N 1293 74 577 172 470 568 725 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05 
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Table 4. Treatment effects for those who learn their region is richer than they thought 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 All 
Low 
income, 
rich 
region 
Low 
income, 
poor 
region 
High 
income, 
rich 
region 
High 
income, 
poor 
region 
Left Non-left 
        
Actual Region rank 0.0228 0.161
**
 -0.0182 0.0464 -0.0184 -0.00624 0.0484
**
 
 (0.0157) (0.0633) (0.0565) (0.0554) (0.0785) (0.0230) (0.0221) 
        
Income Decile 0.0316 -0.0270 0.101 -0.0267 0.0206 0.00676 0.0671
*
 
 (0.0246) (0.0984) (0.0884) (0.0848) (0.107) (0.0353) (0.0354) 
        
Gender -0.397
**
 -0.481
*
 -0.102 -0.511
**
 -0.453 -0.342
*
 -0.475
**
 
 (0.127) (0.271) (0.245) (0.231) (0.319) (0.184) (0.181) 
        
Age 0.112
*
 0.0758 0.0270 0.141 0.294
*
 0.0679 0.157
*
 
 (0.0624) (0.131) (0.118) (0.116) (0.159) (0.0895) (0.0914) 
        
Unempl. 0.123 0.482 0.110 0.456 -0.774
*
 0.309 -0.0384 
 (0.152) (0.294) (0.247) (0.358) (0.433) (0.218) (0.219) 
        
Education 0.0307 0.249 -0.130 0.102 -0.203 0.0486 -0.0266 
 (0.0985) (0.192) (0.174) (0.208) (0.274) (0.144) (0.140) 
        
Ideology -0.00105 -0.128
**
 -0.00183 0.0701 0.121 0.0615 -0.0265 
 (0.0278) (0.0575) (0.0539) (0.0511) (0.0774) (0.0840) (0.0598) 
        
Basque Country 
resident 
-1.169
**
 -0.530  -1.165
**
  -1.725
**
 -0.648
**
 
 (0.221) (0.418)  (0.343)  (0.328) (0.311) 
        
Treatment -0.0958 -0.542
**
 0.117 -0.0498 0.149 -0.333
*
 0.144 
 (0.121) (0.255) (0.235) (0.222) (0.305) (0.174) (0.174) 
        
Constant -0.151 -0.351 0.401 -0.330 0.177 0.236 -0.460 
 (0.381) (0.824) (0.979) (0.953) (1.585) (0.579) (0.612) 
        
pseudo R
2
 0.049 0.092 0.006 0.078 0.061 0.068 0.050 
N 1183 289 304 379 211 604 579 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05 
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Experimental results: priming the “out-group” and information’s effect on preferences  
 To test hypothesis 5, we now examine the impact of priming the out-group on 
preferences for regional redistribution, first focusing on Spain without Catalonia. To do this we 
leverage an aspect of the design that randomly asked some respondents to rank linguistically 
distinct regions on the relative income scale, whereas other respondents were not asked to rank 
such regions.
19
  
We consider respondents only within the treatment group, as this is the only group in 
which respondents were asked to rank their own and other regions before being asked about 
preferences on redistribution. We focus on the potential priming effect of the Basque Country 
and Catalonia because they are the most salient regions regarding autonomy and fiscal 
interdependence issues.20 The estimation results of these priming effects are displayed in Table 
5. 
We find that the priming of ethnically or linguistically distinct regions affects preferences 
for fiscal transfers across regions, confirming hypothesis 5. Further, individuals who learn they 
are poorer and are primed by evaluating one of the linguistically distinct regions are more 
supportive of regional redistribution than those who learn but are not primed. (Recall that these 
areas are generally thought to be among the richer regions). This difference is substantively large 
(.62 vs. .73, p<.02). 
                                                 
19
 22 percent of the Spanish sample outside of Catalonia was asked to rank Catalonia or the 
Basque Country’s relative income. 
20 We check for priming results of the redistribution questions in the control group and find none; 
that is, a respondent’s answer to the question on redistribution does not correlate with ranking 
either the Basque Country nor Catalonia differently.   
31 
 
 We find that this priming effect difference in preferences for regional redistribution is 
driven by individuals who are more right-wing.  Right-wing individuals primed to consider 
ethnic-linguistically distinct regions and learn that they are poorer are much more likely to 
support regional redistribution (.55 v .70, p<.01) than right-wing individuals who learn they are 
poorer but not primed.  In fact, right-wing individuals on average who are primed to rank one of 
the linguistic out-groups are more pro-regional redistribution (.54 v .63, p<.04), but this effect is 
driven by right-wing individuals who learn their region is poorer. Among left-wing individuals 
who learn their region is poorer, the prime has no effect on preferences.  
Recall that left-wing individuals who learned their region was poorer also became more 
supportive of redistribution. This indicates an interesting difference in the effect of ideology and 
information on regional redistribution preferences. We observed that left-wing individuals who 
learn they are poorer become more pro regional redistribution. The effect also occurs among 
right-wing individuals, but only when they are primed to consider linguistically distinct out-
groups as well.  One speculation is that right-wing individuals might view regional redistribution 
issues through the “lens” of views of out-groups, whereas left-wing individuals are more likely 
to apply a standard economic distributional logic.
21
 
                                                 
21
 We conduct a series of alternate specifications to test for other potential priming effects and do 
not find significant differences nor statistically significant coefficients on the relevant binary 
priming variables in estimations controlling for demographic covariates. First, we test 
“neighborhood priming” hypotheses that conjecture that being primed to evaluate one’s 
neighboring region(s) would affect preferences differently from those not primed. We test 
whether being primed by being asked to evaluate either: a) one bordering neighbor, b) two 
neighbors, c) two poorer neighbors, d) two richer neighbors has any effect on preferences, and 
find no effect. Second, we test whether being primed to evaluate two richer or poorer regions 
affects preferences, and find little consistent robust effects on preferences. We do find that 
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Table 5. Priming effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 All 
Learn 
Region is 
richer than 
thought 
Learn 
Region is 
poorer 
than 
thought  
Learn 
Region is 
poorer 
than 
thought, 
Left 
Learn 
Region is 
richer than 
thought, 
Left 
Learn 
Region is 
poorer 
than 
thought, 
non-Left  
Learn 
Region is 
richer than 
thought, 
non-Left 
        
Own regional rank 0.0303
**
 0.0546
**
 0.0166 0.0341 0.0167 0.0125 0.0985
**
 
 (0.00772) (0.0227) (0.0169) (0.0281) (0.0320) (0.0219) (0.0335) 
        
Income Decile 0.0254 0.0481 0.0159 0.126
**
 0.0161 -0.0591 0.0923
*
 
 (0.0162) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0594) (0.0490) (0.0449) (0.0514) 
        
Gender -0.321
**
 -0.409
**
 -0.196 -0.288 -0.343 -0.167 -0.548
**
 
 (0.0818) (0.182) (0.178) (0.290) (0.257) (0.232) (0.269) 
        
Age 0.127
**
 0.0750 0.197
**
 0.262
*
 0.0392 0.178
*
 0.0918 
 (0.0396) (0.0889) (0.0834) (0.142) (0.123) (0.107) (0.133) 
        
Unemployed 0.0712 0.217 -0.0951 0.215 0.358 -0.285 0.0800 
 (0.102) (0.217) (0.220) (0.352) (0.301) (0.287) (0.324) 
        
Education 0.0611 0.162 0.0972 0.0803 0.140 0.0705 0.186 
 (0.0637) (0.144) (0.133) (0.221) (0.211) (0.170) (0.209) 
        
Ideology -0.0450
**
 0.0412 -0.130
**
 0.165 -0.0207 -0.0941 -0.0282 
 (0.0179) (0.0406) (0.0379) (0.137) (0.118) (0.0731) (0.0950) 
        
Cat or BC asked -0.0344 0.0314 0.510
**
 0.213 -0.114 0.695
**
 0.204 
 (0.0965) (0.212) (0.217) (0.355) (0.296) (0.279) (0.311) 
        
Basque Country 
resident 
-1.146
**
 -0.810
**
   -1.127
**
  -0.477 
 (0.183) (0.317)   (0.445)  (0.462) 
        
        
Constant -0.165 -1.066
*
 0.190 -1.314 -0.339 0.436 -1.246 
 (0.239) (0.564) (0.508) (0.839) (0.813) (0.763) (0.929) 
N 2755 589 623 271 305 352 284 
pseudo R
2
 0.038 0.050 0.033 0.049 0.040 0.030 0.074 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
individuals who rank their region as poorer than the two other regions are more pro 
redistribution, but this effect is driven by being asked to evaluate one of the two 
ethnically/linguistically distinct regions, a result discussed above. See the SOA.  
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The impact of information on preferences in Catalonia: regional redistribution 
We now turn to discussion of the results of the treatments in Catalonia, examining both 
in-group vs. out-group priming as well as information treatments. Overall, we find little evidence 
that information (learning about one’s relative regional position) affected preferences for 
redistribution across regions. Comparing the treatment effect of respondents who learn they are 
richer or poorer versus those in the control group who are similarly incorrect yields no 
information effect.  While there are average differences between these three treatment groups 
and the control groups regarding preferences over regional transfers, these differences are not 
robust to inclusion of standard demographic variables. We discuss in the conclusion why 
information seems not to affect such preferences in this region; one reason might be that the 
relative position of Catalonia is not important for individuals, but that other relevant information 
is. In-group priming (the second treatment group within Catalonia) also has no effect on 
redistribution preferences. 
However, we find evidence that out-group priming affects preferences for regional 
redistribution. To test hypothesis 5 in Catalonia, we also assess whether priming via evaluation 
of randomly appearing regions affected preferences over regional redistribution.  This was done 
in the same manner as with the sample outside of Catalonia.  We do this by comparing 
individuals within Treatment 5 (the information-only treatment). Each of the 18 other regions 
within this experimental group is evaluated by approximately 10 percent of the sample. We find 
that the only region that affects preferences over redistribution is Extremadura, the poorest 
region in Spain and also the region more benefited from regional transfers (Paluzie 2010). The 
difference between those primed to evaluate Extremadura and those not is dramatic (.30 vs .13, 
p<.06), and is robust to standard demographic covariates.  This result supports the hypothesis 
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that out-group priming—or priming of “beneficiaries” of redistribution—can dampen support of 
redistribution, consistent with previous results on inter-personal redistribution. Columns 4-5 of 
Table 6 display the estimations of priming results on regional redistribution in Catalonia.  
Table 6: Treatment Results for Catalonia  
 Catalonia Catalonia Catalonia 
Catalonia,  
primed by 
Extremadura 
DV: 
Interreg. 
transfers 
Interreg. 
transfers 
Interreg. 
transfers 
Interreg. 
transfers 
     
Own region rank 0.030 0.018 0.0050 0.014 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.034) 
     
Income Decile 0.0020 0.027 0.029 0.033 
 (0.046) (0.041) (0.040) (0.053) 
     
Female -0.14 -0.36
*
 -0.24 -0.71
***
 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.20) (0.28) 
     
Age category 0.15 0.24** 0.021 0.21* 
 (0.11) (0.097) (0.092) (0.13) 
     
Unemployed -0.10 0.27 0.14 0.25 
 (0.34) (0.28) (0.29) (0.36) 
     
Education -0.10 0.27
*
 0.0094 0.45
**
 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) 
     
Ideology -0.054 -0.027 -0.061 0.0027 
 (0.057) (0.050) (0.047) (0.066) 
     
Cat ID -1.16
***
 -1.17
***
 -1.06
***
 -1.05
***
 
 (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) (0.28) 
     
Treat. 4 0.29    
 (0.23)    
     
Treat. 5  0.42**   
  (0.21)   
     
Treat. 6   0.49
**
  
   (0.21)  
     
Extremadura asked    -1.19
**
 
    (0.57) 
     
Constant -0.88 -2.19
***
 -0.80 -2.10
***
 
 (0.69) (0.64) (0.60) (0.80) 
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N 475 565 578 344 
pseudo R
2
 0.058 0.068 0.049 0.087 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
Section 5. Conclusions and Extensions 
In this paper we present one of the few studies on individual preferences over regional 
redistribution, a question that has been surprisingly understudied given the recent explosion in 
research on fiscal federalism.  We provide and test some simple micro-foundations of such 
preferences across different levels in an illustrative multi-tiered system of Spain. We find that 
preferences of regional redistribution cannot be explained completely by the simple baseline 
model of regional income. But, we find some support for recent theoretical frameworks that 
explicitly incorporate the interplay between individual and regional incomes, and build on this by 
testing assumptions about knowledge of regional incomes, ideology, and second dimensional 
issues. Regarding the basic income variables, we find that poorer individuals in richer regions are 
hostile towards regional redistribution. And consistent with the literature on second-dimensional 
politics (Amat 2012), we find that individuals in the richer linguistically distinct regions are 
more hostile towards regional redistribution.   
We additionally test and confirm basic hypotheses with an experiment and find that 
information provision about a region’s relative income affects preferences for regional 
redistribution.  This manipulation of information is akin to exogenously manipulating relative 
income; thus changes in relative regional income are linked to preferences in regional 
redistribution.  Individuals who learn they are poorer are more supportive of redistribution, and 
those in richer regions who learn they are richer become less supportive of such redistribution.  
Importantly, this latter result is largely driven by poorer individuals in richer regions, a result 
consistent with our intuitions about how such individuals view regional redistribution.  
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We also find that political ideology is a strong moderator in the relationship between 
regional income and preferences for inter-regional redistribution. Left-wing individuals who 
learn that they live in a poorer region than they thought become significantly more in favor of 
inter-regional redistribution, while those who learn that they live in a richer region than they 
thought become more opposed. In contrast, right wing respondents’ views towards to inter-
regional transfers are affected more by priming of out-groups.  
We find less evidence of such informational effects in Catalonia, though we find more 
evidence of second-dimensional considerations affecting views towards regional redistribution 
(based on priming consideration of specific regions). The null information results in Catalonia 
could exist because the issues or information regarding relative regional ranking are less 
important, or because the salience of the issue of inter-regional transfers in the current public 
debate implies that Catalan respondents have already factored in the effect of these relative 
economic considerations in their preferences.  
Our empirical design and results have broader implications.  They first provide a gap in 
explaining redistribution preferences in multilevel systems. Second, they also demonstrate the 
ways in which providing simple information and exogenously manipulating relative income can 
affect preferences for regional redistribution. Overall, we hope that this paper lays a foundation 
for examining more specific ways in which relevant information as well as out-group priming 
affects preferences over issues relevant to fiscal federalism, as politicians would surely use both 
to shape the nature of political debate on this heated topic. 
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Appendix A: Netquest Protocol 
 
The Netquest survey uses opt-in panels, based on existing databases of nationally representative 
samples of residents of Spain.  The panel is constrained to individuals at least 18 years of age.  
The sample is stratified with representative quotas of the Spanish population by geographical 
area (seven geographical areas), age group, and gender.  Netquest compensates economically all 
participants with vouchers that can be used later to purchase goods at Netquest’s online store.  
Full documentation on sample compilation is available upon request. 
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Appendix B: Rankings of Regions ( 1= richest; 19 = poorest) 
1 Basque Country 
2 Navarra 
3 Madrid 
4 Catalonia 
5 Rioja 
6 Aragon 
7 Balearic Islands 
8 Castile and Leon 
9 Cantabria 
10 Asturias 
11 Galicia 
12 Valencia 
13 Ceuta 
14 Canary Islands 
15 Murcia 
16 Castile – La Mancha 
17 Melilla 
18 Andalusia 
19 Extremadura 
The ranking is made on the basis of 2011 regional GDP per capita. 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2012).  
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 Mean (Std.Dev) Total (Percent) 
 Spain  
without Cat. 
Catalonia Spain  
without Cat. 
Catalonia 
Female   1431 (51%) 575 (48%) 
Age 38.7 (11.5) 44.6 (12.8)   
Household Size 3.08 (1.3) 2.9 (1.1)   
Ideology (1-10) 4.51 (2.2) 3.87 (2.04)   
Income Decile 5.5 (2.8) 6.3 (2.67)   
Education (3 
categories) 
2.44 (.67) 2.44 (.66)   
Unemployed   594 (21.2%)  180 (15%) 
Identifies as More 
Catalan than Spanish 
   616 (52%) 
Catalan Language 
Native 
   566 (47%) 
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Supplemental Online Appendix 
 
SOA Table A1. Comparison of Samples. Spain (without Catalonia) 
 
Variable Netquest survey National Representative 
Survey  
Survey 
Female Women: 51% Women: 51% CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Age Mean: 38.7% (sd: 11.5) 
18-24: 12.35% 
25-34: 26.92% 
35-44: 29.87% 
45-55: 21.02% 
55+: 9.84% 
Mean: 47.52% (sd: 17.6) 
18-24: 8.75% 
25-34: 20.01% 
35-44: 20.85% 
45-54: 17.94% 
55+: 32.45% 
CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Vote recall 
(Nov. 11 
elections) 
 
PSOE: 19.11% 
PP: 27.32% 
IU: 9.21% 
UPyD: 8.32% 
PSOE: 22.22% 
PP: 30.35%  
IU: 5.68% 
UPyD: 3.51% 
CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Ideology (1-10) 4.51 (sd: 2.2) 4.85 (sd: 1.84) CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Education 
 
Primary or basic 
secondary: 10.17% 
Upper secondary: 
36.87% 
University: 52.96% 
 
Primary or basic secondary: 
45.02% 
Upper secondary: 30.16% 
University: 24.82% 
 
CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Unemployed 21.2% 26.31% CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Income  We define income deciles based on the information 
INE’s Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (The national 
representative survey used in international studies on 
income distribution such as the Luxembourg Income 
Study). Perfect representativeness of the survey means 
that 10 % of the sample fall into each decile. The actual 
percentages for each decile are the following:  
1st : 8.25%; 2nd: 11.25%; 3rd: 9.71%; 4th: 10.25%; 5th: 
10.21%; 6th:10.54%; 7th:10.11%; 8th: 11.29%; 9th: 
10.93%; 10th: 7.46%  
 
INE, Encuesta de 
Condiciones de Vida 
2011. 
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 SOA Table A2. Comparison of Samples. Catalonia 
 
 
Variable Netquest survey National Representative 
Survey  
Survey 
Female Women: 51.0% Women: 50.7% CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Age Mean: 38.7% (sd: 11.5) 
18-24: 9.7% 
25-34: 15.65% 
35-44: 19.14% 
45-55: 28.41% 
55+: 27.10% 
Mean: 47.52% (sd: 17.6) 
18-24: 7.81% 
25-34: 20.65% 
35-44: 20.15% 
45-54: 17.88% 
55+: 33.5% 
CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Vote recall 
(Nov. 11 
elections) 
 
PSOE: 16.83% 
PP: 9.42% 
IU: 8.92% 
UPyD: 1% 
CiU: 19.5% 
 
PSOE: 20.54% 
PP: 7.92% 
IU: 8.66% 
UPyD: 1.49% 
CiU: 12.38% 
 
CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Ideology (1-
10) 
3.87 (sd: 2.04) 3.94 (sd: 1.84) CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Education 
 
Primary or basic 
secondary: 10.09% 
Upper secondary: 39.19% 
University: 50.71% 
 
Primary or basic secondary: 
40.1% 
Upper secondary: 35.5% 
University: 24.5% 
 
CIS 2976. January 
2013 
Unemployed 
 
15.1% 26.98% CIS 2976. January 
2013  
Income  We define income deciles based on the information INE’s 
Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (The national 
representative survey used in international studies on 
income distribution such as the Luxembourg Income 
Study). Perfect representativeness of the survey means 
that 10 % of the sample fall into each decile. The actual 
percentages for each decile are the following:  
1st : 5.25%; 2nd: 6.42%; 3rd: 7.33%; 4th: 8.17%; 5th: 
10.5%; 6th:11.25%; 7th:11.33%; 8th: 13.25%; 9th: 14.92%; 
10th: 11.58%  
 
INE, Encuesta de 
Condiciones de Vida 
2011. 
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SOA Table B: Randomization Checks 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
 Spain exc Cat Spain exc Cat Catalonia Catalonia Catalonia Catalonia 
Age -0.00237 0.00237 -0.00507 -0.00108 -0.00693 0.0116** 
 (0.00348) (0.00348) (0.00609) (0.00585) (0.00527) (0.00534) 
       
Region 
rank 
-0.00281 0.00281     
 (0.00672) (0.00672)     
       
Female -0.0202 0.0202 -0.0637 -0.101 -0.0106 0.137 
 (0.0789) (0.0789) (0.153) (0.146) (0.132) (0.131) 
       
Ideology 0.00544 -0.00544 0.0628* 0.00913 -0.0152 -0.0394 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0364) (0.0352) (0.0319) (0.0319) 
       
Unemploy
ed 
-0.0638 0.0638 -0.229 0.0682 0.160 -0.0503 
 (0.0987) (0.0987) (0.230) (0.212) (0.189) (0.190) 
       
HH size 0.0227 -0.0227 -0.00609 -0.0223 0.126** -0.103* 
 (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0670) (0.0645) (0.0584) (0.0588) 
       
Income 
decile 
0.00189 -0.00189 -0.0327 0.0118 0.0161 -0.00132 
 (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0306) (0.0295) (0.0265) (0.0264) 
       
Educ cat -0.0429 0.0429 0.124 0.176 -0.0710 -0.152 
 (0.0613) (0.0613) (0.120) (0.116) (0.101) (0.100) 
       
_cons 0.186 -0.186 -1.485** -1.684** -0.840* -0.595 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.535) (0.516) (0.461) (0.463) 
N 2756 2756 1183 1183 1183 1183 
pseudo R
2
 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.010 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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SOA Table C1: Non effects when primed to rank neighboring regions, for those who learn 
they are poorer 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
All 
Low income, 
rich region 
Low income, 
poor region 
High 
income, rich 
region 
High 
income, poor 
region 
Left Non-left 
        
Region 
Rank 
0.0177 -0.0517 0.0641 0.0297 0.121** 0.0364 0.0113 
 (0.0169) (0.169) (0.0471) (0.139) (0.0512) (0.0281) (0.0217) 
        
Income 
decile 
0.0158 -0.0470 0.107 -0.224 -0.0420 0.125** -0.0573 
 (0.0349) (0.289) (0.0932) (0.228) (0.111) (0.0594) (0.0446) 
        
Female -0.190 0.424 -0.292 -0.399 -0.118 -0.294 -0.138 
 (0.177) (0.937) (0.263) (0.559) (0.316) (0.291) (0.230) 
        
Age 0.208** 0.728 0.206* -0.178 0.230 0.267* 0.190* 
 (0.0834) (0.503) (0.121) (0.283) (0.149) (0.142) (0.107) 
        
Neigh 
Asked 
0.0824 1.232 0.356 0.580 -0.475 -0.0368 0.187 
 (0.189) (1.072) (0.283) (0.727) (0.312) (0.321) (0.239) 
        
Unempl
oyed 
-0.0980 -0.129 0.0897 -1.461 -0.152 0.214 -0.311 
 (0.219) (0.915) (0.281) (1.321) (0.475) (0.351) (0.286) 
        
Educ 
cat 
0.0885 0.880 -0.283 1.020* 0.303 0.0794 0.0553 
 (0.132) (0.659) (0.187) (0.569) (0.245) (0.221) (0.169) 
        
Ideology -0.125** -0.248 -0.105* -0.359** -0.0993 0.162 -0.0679 
 (0.0376) (0.204) (0.0547) (0.135) (0.0665) (0.137) (0.0719) 
        
_cons 0.220 -2.041 -0.181 2.140 -1.559 -1.289 0.365 
 (0.507) (2.162) (0.970) (2.005) (1.294) (0.836) (0.762) 
N 623 36 288 77 222 271 352 
pseudo 
R
2
 
0.026 0.134 0.042 0.154 0.052 0.048 0.018 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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SOA Table C2: Non effects when primed to rank neighboring regions, for those who learn 
they are richer 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
All 
Low 
income, rich 
region 
Low 
income, 
poor region 
High 
income, rich 
region 
High 
income, 
poor region 
Left Non-left 
        
Region Rank 0.0874** 0.189** -0.0400 0.179** 0.00720 0.0630** 0.118** 
 (0.0190) (0.0718) (0.0873) (0.0620) (0.128) (0.0264) (0.0282) 
        
Income 
decile 
0.0514 -0.0382 0.109 -0.0582 0.156 0.0171 0.0987* 
 (0.0347) (0.148) (0.126) (0.115) (0.173) (0.0488) (0.0511) 
        
Female -0.350* -0.717* 0.0663 -0.449 -0.241 -0.248 -0.502* 
 (0.179) (0.396) (0.370) (0.309) (0.491) (0.251) (0.266) 
        
Age 0.0608 0.0274 -0.0798 0.170 0.426 0.0460 0.0760 
 (0.0879) (0.192) (0.166) (0.162) (0.260) (0.121) (0.131) 
        
Neigh 
Asked 
0.00894 0.506 -0.0315 -0.349 -0.599 0.128 -0.0852 
 (0.178) (0.385) (0.360) (0.328) (0.500) (0.257) (0.255) 
        
Unemployed 0.189 0.526 0.308 0.410 -1.038* 0.349 0.0740 
 (0.217) (0.416) (0.356) (0.527) (0.609) (0.307) (0.323) 
        
Educ cat 0.159 0.421 -0.151 0.248 0.127 0.150 0.173 
 (0.144) (0.303) (0.264) (0.296) (0.436) (0.210) (0.208) 
        
Ideology 0.0411 -0.209** 0.127 0.123* 0.243** -0.0204 -0.0179 
 (0.0404) (0.0854) (0.0902) (0.0734) (0.115) (0.117) (0.0943) 
        
_cons -1.428** -1.123 0.362 -1.538 -2.522 -1.003 -1.434 
 (0.548) (1.229) (1.505) (1.300) (2.508) (0.787) (0.903) 
N 589 146 148 197 98 305 284 
pseudo R2 0.041 0.101 0.019 0.061 0.106 0.024 0.070 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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SOA Table D1: Ranking two other regions as poorer or richer and effect if one learns 
region is poorer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
All 
Low income, 
rich region 
Low income, 
poor region 
High 
income, rich 
region 
High 
income, poor 
region 
Left Non-left 
        
Region 
rank 
-0.000703 0.175 0.0141 -0.0204 0.130** 0.0259 -0.0112 
 (0.0220) (0.199) (0.0562) (0.188) (0.0596) (0.0344) (0.0302) 
        
Income 
decile 
-0.00982 0.225 0.129 -0.0170 -0.120 0.0933 -0.0879* 
 (0.0394) (0.341) (0.106) (0.269) (0.129) (0.0649) (0.0514) 
        
Female -0.159 0.347 -0.204 0.0378 -0.345 -0.0647 -0.259 
 (0.199) (1.167) (0.304) (0.622) (0.349) (0.322) (0.260) 
        
Age 0.211** 0.663 0.180 -0.161 0.339** 0.245 0.201* 
 (0.0923) (0.691) (0.136) (0.326) (0.167) (0.156) (0.117) 
        
Rank 
poorer 
other2 
0.215 . 0.676* -18.96 -0.475 0.0952 0.259 
 (0.254) . (0.356) (2969.2) (0.422) (0.412) (0.327) 
        
Rank 
richer 
other2 
0.0441 1.299 0.245 -17.39 -0.120 0.169 -0.0709 
 (0.251) (1.503) (0.376) (2969.2) (0.395) (0.398) (0.338) 
        
Unemplo
yed 
-0.120 -0.908 0.120 -1.107 -0.335 0.190 -0.242 
 (0.245) (0.999) (0.326) (1.298) (0.525) (0.403) (0.319) 
        
Educ cat 0.134 1.198 -0.346 0.801 0.556** 0.103 0.144 
 (0.151) (0.824) (0.225) (0.698) (0.278) (0.245) (0.198) 
        
Ideology -0.139** -0.453 -0.0951 -0.375** -0.148* 0.132 -0.0352 
 (0.0437) (0.283) (0.0666) (0.154) (0.0758) (0.157) (0.0848) 
        
_cons 0.394 -4.054 0.407 18.38 -1.920 -1.184 0.302 
 (0.595) (3.071) (1.146) (2969.2) (1.441) (0.991) (0.906) 
N 483 29 216 60 178 211 272 
pseudoR2  0.026 0.160 0.045 0.163 0.081 0.031 0.022 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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SOA Table D2: Ranking two other regions as poorer or richer and effect if one learns 
region is richer 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Region 
rank 
0.0678** 0.218** -0.0315 0.160** 0.0513 0.0502 0.0953** 
 (0.0249) (0.0879) (0.101) (0.0751) (0.158) (0.0356) (0.0361) 
        
Income 
decile 
0.0500 -0.0139 0.126 -0.191 0.153 0.00762 0.101* 
 (0.0395) (0.176) (0.141) (0.141) (0.205) (0.0553) (0.0586) 
        
Female -0.473** -0.675 0.0733 -0.702* -0.546 -0.335 -0.587** 
 (0.203) (0.453) (0.426) (0.367) (0.592) (0.286) (0.299) 
        
Age -0.0150 -0.0261 -0.184 0.0454 0.484 -0.0757 0.0523 
 (0.102) (0.210) (0.197) (0.199) (0.308) (0.139) (0.155) 
        
Rank 
poorer 
other2 
0.0962 0.620 -0.823* 0.758 0.291 -0.0461 0.162 
 (0.232) (0.519) (0.453) (0.464) (0.636) (0.330) (0.337) 
        
Rank 
richer 
other2 
-0.385 -0.245 -0.0330 0.0868 0.250 -0.638* -0.164 
 (0.274) (0.556) (0.937) (0.435) (1.089) (0.379) (0.415) 
        
Unempl
oyed 
0.00718 0.396 0.153 -0.217 -0.840 0.226 -0.195 
 (0.244) (0.483) (0.401) (0.626) (0.776) (0.339) (0.364) 
        
Educ cat 0.0790 0.291 -0.153 0.331 -0.0697 0.0243 0.0870 
 (0.165) (0.353) (0.306) (0.351) (0.494) (0.237) (0.247) 
        
Ideology 0.0340 -0.180* 0.0297 0.144* 0.259* -0.0430 0.0347 
 (0.0456) (0.0953) (0.109) (0.0830) (0.133) (0.131) (0.108) 
        
_cons -0.704 -0.908 1.447 -0.543 -3.086 0.139 -1.322 
 (0.643) (1.489) (1.763) (1.487) (2.870) (0.917) (1.053) 
N 469 118 118 154 79 245 224 
pseudo 
R2 
0.048 0.126 0.038 0.093 0.116 0.042 0.072 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
 
47 
 
SOA Table E: Lack of information effects by partisan vote intention  
     
 PSOE supporters, 
learn richer 
PSOE supporters, 
learn poorer 
PP supporters, 
learn richer 
PP supporters, 
learn poorer 
     
Region rank 0.0569 0.0154 0.0641 0.00483 
 (0.0382) (0.0368) (0.0392) (0.0253) 
     
Income decile 0.0234 0.00818 0.0871 -0.0111 
 (0.0643) (0.0714) (0.0718) (0.0546) 
     
Female -0.645* -1.002** -1.179** -0.0546 
 (0.345) (0.369) (0.382) (0.287) 
     
Age 0.160 0.299* 0.230 0.0621 
 (0.174) (0.166) (0.183) (0.138) 
     
Unemployed 0.607 0.587 0.106 -0.238 
 (0.457) (0.436) (0.448) (0.343) 
     
Educ cat 0.0237 0.324 0.192 -0.0264 
 (0.253) (0.253) (0.305) (0.227) 
     
Ideology 0.121 -0.106 -0.00976 -0.154* 
 (0.106) (0.0978) (0.106) (0.0826) 
     
Treatment 0.0336 0.123 0.346 -0.324 
 (0.331) (0.339) (0.369) (0.275) 
     
_cons -0.439 -0.0887 -1.373 1.791* 
 (0.984) (1.010) (1.435) (0.985) 
N 183 201 141 241 
pseudo R
2
 0.052 0.084 0.099 0.019 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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SOA Figure A. Screenshot of the AC’s Placement Question 
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